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Abstract
McAfee and McMillan (1992) investigate the coordinated biding strategies in a strong
cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer pay-
ments, and show that the strong cartel mechanism is incentive-compatible and efficient. In
this paper however, we show the strong cartel mechanism is no longer ratifiable in the pres-
ence of participation cost, in which case the bidder with the highest value in the cartel would
have incentive to veto for the collusive mechanism. This behavior could make the maximum
benefit for the winning bidder.
1 Introduction
Asymmetric information is pervasive in economic activities, and often brings about collusive
behaviors. In reality, the collusive problem often happens in an industry with heterogeneous
firms and private information. In order to reduce the possibility of inefficiency due to collusion
among bidders, people often use auction mechanism to enhance efficiency.
Myerson (1981) considers the optimal auction design problem of a seller who has an indivisible
object to sell to one of several buyers. While there is imperfect information of the paying price
between the seller and buyers, the seller’s problem is to design an auction game that gives
her the highest possible expected profit at Nash equilibrium. Thus, the seller must consider
all probabilities of buyers’ evaluation and try to choose an auction design which offers her
the highest expected revenue. Alternatively speaking, bidders also want to choose an optimal
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bidding strategy to maximize their benefits. If asymmetric information exists, bidders might
cooperate to gain the monopoly power to earn the most surplus in the auction.
Is optimal auction mechanism able to prevent collusive behavior? The answer may be no.
Bidders could still find a way to profitably collude and share the generated collusive surplus by
their private information. Cooper (1977) finds the anecdotal evidence from antiques and artwork
auctions which indicates retaliatory strategies are in fact used to enforce collusion. When one of
the ring members goes against his partners, or the ring falls out for one reason or another, then
it works very well to the seller’s advantage as vindicative competition leads to crazy prices.
Roberts (1983) studies the incentive mechanism design problem in the presence of collusive
behavior. He finds if types of the firm are sufficiently similar, then the monopoly collusive
mechanism cannot be achieved without side payments. If side payments are allowed, such
collusion is possible with a dominant strategy and this mechanism is essentially equivalent to
the second-price auction. Cramton and Palfrey (1995) attempt to find what cartel agreements
are possible when firms have private information about production costs. They characterize a
set of cartel agreements that can be supported while recognizing incentives and participation
constraints. The incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from
achieving the monopoly outcome in either Cournot or Bertrand competition. However, if the
cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by members, the incentive problem
can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost of uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible
in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.
However, as McAfee and McMillan (1992) (hereafter MM) point out, the efficient colluding
mechanism is generally not freely implemented. They discuss the bidding strategies in first-price
sealed-bid auction in two cases: weak cartel, in which bidders cannot make transfer payments
and strong cartel, in which the cartel members exclude new entrants and can make transfer
payments. They show in the setting of weak cartel, the optimal outcome can be implemented
without coordination. This means bidders can bid identical bid in the legit auction to achieve
the optimal situation, because in the absence of side-payments, incentive compatibility requires
the good should be awarded stochastically, with equal probability of being awarded to anyone
whose value is larger than the minimum price: any attempt to arrange that the highest-value
bidder wins generates incentives for the bidders to misstate their valuations. By submitting
equal bids, the bidders in effect use the seller as their randomizing device. If bidders’ values are
lower than or equal to the reserve price, they have negative or zero revenue to win the auction.
Thus any transfer scheme cannot be lump-sum and the bidder who fails to receive a transfer
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payment with the highest valuation has an incentive to overstate his valuation. But in strong
cartel concept, the optimal cartel mechanism can be implemented by a prior auction, and reach
the efficiency.
When people consider (interim) individual rationality constraint following the standard
mechanism design approach, they compare bidders’ interim payoffs from the collusive mech-
anism with those from an equilibrium of the seller’s auction, i.e., the status quo. However, that
the status quo here is a strategic interaction, and its outcome is affected by bidders’ beliefs
about others’ values. This observation is important if bidders are making interim participation
decisions for the collusive mechanism. Others can make inferences about a bidder’s type from
her choice between the collusive mechanism and the status quo, which in turn may affect the
outcome of the status quo game if it is played. In Carmton and Palfrey (1995) paper, they refer
to this possibility as the information leakage problem from participation decisions. To address
this problem, they consider a two-stage process: Players simultaneously vote for or against the
proposed mechanism. This vote occurs at the interim stage, i.e., when players have private
information. If the mechanism is unanimous;y ratified, then it is implemented; otherwise the
status quo game is played under revised beliefs where these satisfy consistency requirements in
the spirit of rational expectations.
The fundamental structure of the auction with participation costs is one that an indivisible
object is allocated to one of many potential buyers, and in order to participate in the auction,
buyers must incur some costs, like entry fees or participation costs. After the cost is incurred,
a bidder can submit a bid. Sometimes pre-bid costs are also required to get bidders involved in
auctions, as Mills (1993) points out the bidding cost in a government procurement auction often
runs into millions of dollars. If there is participation cost, the result for a collusive mechanism
might change. According to this, we should consider the MM’s model with participation costs to
make the model more realistic than the model in the original setting. If a bidder’s expected profit
from attending an auction is less than the participation cost, he will not attend the auction.
Even though the bidder’s valuation is greater than the participation cost, he may not have the
same bidding strategy as in an auction without participation costs.
Tan and Yilankaya (2007) investigate properties of second price auctions with equal partic-
ipation costs when bidders’ values are private information. They apply Carmton and Palfrey’s
(1995) method to show that the standard efficient collusive mechanisms characterized in the
literature for the independent private values environment are not ratifiable when the status quo
is a second-price auction and there are participation costs, however small they may be.
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In MM paper, they interpret their efficiency model in first-price sealed-bid auction. Due to
the cartel might not always be formed, there may incur information leakage problem. In this
paper, we focus on the ratifiability of the cartel mechanism in first-price sealed-bid auction.
We use the bidding function and equilibrium found in Cao and Tian (2009) paper to show the
efficient cartel mechanism defined in “strong cartel” would not be ratifiable in the first-price
sealed-bid auction with participation costs. This means there is a discontinuity between c = 0
and c > 0.
In section 2 we briefly describe the basic model setting. Section 3, we discuss the intuition
about our investigation. We show equilibrium with different cutoff values in section 4. Section
5 is conclusion. All proofs are included in the appendix.
2 Model
In our setting, the seller and bidders are all risk-neutral, and rational. The bidder i’s valuation
for an indivisible object is vi (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and vi is private information to the other bidders.
We assume vi is independently distributed 1 with a cumulative distribution function Fi(·), and it
is continuously differentiable with a density function fi(·) > 0, within [0, 1]. Following the MM
model with homogeneous bidders, we discuss the case that bidders’ valuations (v1, v2, . . . , vn)
are drawn from the same distribution function; i.e., F1(·) = F2(·) = · · · = Fn(·) We denote a
participation cost, c, which bidders must pay before they bid by c ∈ [0, 1]. The seller values her
object at r ∈ [0, 1]. Only the winner in the legit auction has to pay the reserve price but all
bidders who participate in the legit auction have to pay the participation cost. This cost would
make losers earn negative profit. The seller’s behavior is passive in this model. She announces
a reserve price and sells at the highest bid to the bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction. We
also assume that the seller knows neither she faces a cartel nor she is bound to the rules of the
sealed-bid auction.
According to MM paper, we assume that the efficient cartel designs an incentive-compatible
1As mentioned in MM paper, the assumption of independent distribution rules out correlated valuations. This
may make the model not compatible with some auctions where collusion occurred in real world. However, this
assumption is not inconsistent while there are still some factors could also affect bidders’ valuations. If there is
a limited edition car on an auction with its actual value Vi = P + si, where si represents each bidder’s personal
valuation of the car and P is its future market price, the same for all bidders and which is independent of the si,
then the independent private value assumption could still be applied to situations with common value elements.
This provides the independence assumption in the model that all bidders with the same information about the
common aspects would be satisfied.
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mechanism in order to maximize the ex ante (before the valuations are known) sum of bidders’
expected profits in the auction which means this cartel is self-enforcing.
The information setting is interim. Bidders only know their own private information before
they bid in the prior auction in the cartel and they do not know others’ valuations when they
makes their own decisions. The cartel would choose the bidder with the highest bid in the prior
auction to bid in the legit auction.
The timing of our model among the bidders is as follows. Considering possible cartel forma-
tion between date 1 and date 2,
• At date 1, a cartel mechanism exists and all bidders are in this mechanism at beginning.
• At date 115 , nature draws a private valuation vi for each bidder i.
• At date 125 , each bidder bids in the prior auction.
• At date 135 , bidders update their beliefs and vote for or against the collusive mechanism.
• At date 145 , the game form specified in the collusive mechanism is played at date 2, if
all bidders accepted the collusive mechanism at date 135 . If at least one bidder rejects
the collusive mechanism, no collusion occurs. Bidders bid in the legit auction at date 2
noncooperatively.
Note that the collusion is formed after the agents make participation decisions. We also assume
when a bidder is indifference between staying in and vetoing for the cartel, he would choose to
stay in the cartel.
An efficient cartel mechanism provides bidder i to win with probability pi(vi, v−i) if and only
if his value exceeds the minimum price r plus the cost c and all the other bidders’ values v−i .
The latter occurs with probability, F (vi)n−1. The efficiency2 is then characterized by
E−ipi(vi, v−i) =
 F (vi)n−1 vi ≥ r + c0 vi < r + c.
The profit function is pii(·) ≥ 0. Besides, the winner in the prior auction becomes the only
bidder in the legit auction and would win the auction for sure, because there is no other bidder
2If a cartel member whose value is less than or equal to the minimum price r plus the participation cost c is
constrained to earn zero profit, then efficiency implies noncooperative profit levels.
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outside the cartel. So, he would pay the reserve price r plus the participation cost c, and pay
the transfer payment3, Z(·)4, to all members in the cartel.
The individual action set for any bidder can be characterized as N0 ∪ [0, 1], where “N0”
denotes not submitting a bid. An equilibrium strategy of whether to participate is given by
a profile of the bidders’ cutoff points, which are a vector of the minimum valuations for each
bidder i to cover the cost. Assume that a bidder with zero probability of winning would not bid
more than his true value when he participates in the auction5. Given the strategies of all other
bidders, a bidder’s expected revenue from participating in the legit auction is a non-decreasing
function of his own valuation6. Let v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v∗n) denote the profile of bidders’ cutoff points.
The bidding decision function bi(·) of each bidder is characterized by
bi(vi, v∗) =
 λi(vi, v∗) 1 ≥ vi ≥ v∗iNo vi < v∗i .
where λi(vi, v∗) is a contingent bidding function when bidder i participates in the auction.
Once a bidder enters the prior auction, he can observe who have also entered the prior auction
and can update his belief about others’ valuation. If we observe that bidder i participates in
the prior auction, it can be inferred that bidder i’s value is bigger than or equal to v∗i . Using
Bayes’ rule, we believe that bidder i’s value is distributed on [v∗i , 1] with
Pr(ξ ≤ v|v ≥ v∗i ) =
Pr(v∗i ≤ ξ < v)
Pr(ξ ≥ v∗i )
=
Fi(v)− Fi(v∗i )
1− Fi(v∗i )
.
The corresponding density function is given by fi(v)1−Fi(v∗i ) .
3As McAfee and McMillan (1992) show in the first-price sealed-bid auction, if the highest bid in this prior
auction exceeds r, the winner then bids r in the legit auction and pays each of the losers an equal share of the
difference between his bid in the prior auction and r.
4We use Z(·) in this paper which is equal to T (·)− r in MM paper.
5Without this assumption a bidder with value vi, who in optimum has zero probability of winning, can
sometimes bid more than his value. However, this bidding strategy can be eliminated by a trembling-hand
argument. Once a bidder bids above his value, he may have positive probability to win the object which gives
him a negative revenue. For a bidder, bidding below his value when he has zero probability of winning can also
be supported in an optimal bidding strategy. However the allocation is the same as the optimal bidding strategy
where he bids his value. For simplicity, we eliminate it.
6Lu and Sun (2007) show that for any auction mechanism with participation costs, the participating and
nonparticipating types of any bidder are divided by a nondecreasing and equicontinuous shutdown curve. Thus
in our framework, when participation cost is given, the participating and nonparticipating types of any bidder
can be divided by a cutoff value and the threshold form is the only form of equilibria.
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3 Intuition
A profit-maximizing cartel clearly prefers efficiency in the absence of incentive constraints, so
that the pie to be divided among the members is as large as possible.
We can easily find the bidder with the highest value in the cartel would have incentive to
veto for the mechanism in strong cartel with participation costs. The profit for bidder to bid
alone in the legit auction is larger than he stays in the cartel. While bidders participating in
the prior auction, they report their own bid to the cartel mechanism, and the ith bidder would
win the object with probability pi(vi, v−i). Then, bidder i’s expected benefit is
pii = E−i[vipi(vi, v−i)− Zi(vi, v−i)− r − c].
where E−i is the expectation over v−i, Zi is the expected transfer payment by bidder i, and c
is participation cost. If the transfers are prohibited, Zi equals 0. In strong cartel setting, it is
able to make transfer payments among its members. Each losing bidder in the cartel could get
zi =
Zi(vi, v−i)
n− 1 .
If we play the game step by step, the bidder i, who has the highest valuation in the prior
auction, would represent the cartel to bid in the auction. He will pay the participation cost c,
and bid the value r to win the object. The seller will get r, and the winner i’s benefit would be
pisi = vi − Zi(vi, v−i)− r − c ≥ 0, , where pisi is the profit he stays in the cartel. pivi is the profit
he vetoes for the cartel.
There are two reasons to explain the winner have incentive to veto for the cartel.
(1) After the prior auction, he knows that no one has higher valuation than himself.
If he is the only one who enters the auction, he can just pay r + c and win this
auction. At this time, his benefit is pivi = vi−r−c ≥ pisi = vi−Zi(vi, v−i)−r−c ≥ 0.
(2) All the other bidders know who has the highest bid in the cartel after prior
auction. If the winner in the prior auction bids his bid in the legit auction, they
have no chance to win. After they update their belief, no one wants to join
the auction because they would lose the auction for sure and have to pay the
participation cost c, which makes them get negative profits.
According to the reasons mentioned above, the winner vetoing for the cartel could earn
the maximum benefit, and others get zero benefit in this game. In this intuition, the cartel
mechanism could not be sustainable.
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4 Equilibrium
4.1 MM Model: The Benchmark Case
We set the participation cost, c, equal to zero to discuss the benchmark case of the strong cartel
model in MM paper.
The strong cartel mechanism works as follows. While the bidders reporting their values to
the cartel mechanism, the ith bidder is awarded the good with probability pi(wi, w−i), wi is the
value reported from bidder i. Then, bidder i’s expected profit, if he has value vi and reports wi,
is
pii = E−i[vipi(wi, w−i)− Zi(wi, w−i)]− r.
where E−i is the expectation over w−i. After dropping the bidder indices to simplify the notation,
we can show:
pi = [v − Z(w)]F (w)n−1
+ [1− F (w)n−1]
∫ vh
w
[
Z(u)
n− 1]
(n− 1)F (u)n−2f(u)
1− F (w)n−1 du
= [v − Z(w)]F (w)n−1
+
∫ vh
w
[Z(u)]F (u)n−2f(u)du
where vh is the highest value in the cartel. Finally, we get ∂pi∂w |w=v = 0, which means everyone in
the cartel would report their value truthfully, which means the incentive compatible condition
is satisfied.
They get the following result to specify the optimal direct mechanism:
Proposition 1 Suppose c = 0, the strong cartel mechanism is incentive-compatible and effi-
cient. Before the auction, the cartel members report their valuations to the mechanism. If no
report exceeds r, the cartel does not bid in the auction. If at least one bid exceeds r, the bidder
making the highest report v obtains the item and pays a total of
Z(v) + r = F (v)−n
∫ v
r
(u− r)(n− 1)F (u)n−1f(u)du+ r.
and each losing bidder receives from the winner [Z(v)/(n− 1)]
This cartel mechanism can be implemented by holding a prior first-price sealed-bid auction.
Everyone can update the information about the highest valuation in the prior auction. This
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mechanism has the property that all losing bidders receive a transfer which means bidders
whose value is less than the minimum price earn positive profits.
This cartel convinced under the Sherman antitrust Act of 1980, six cast-iron-pipe manufac-
turers, operated a knockout. In those cities not reserved for a particular firm, the price was fixed
by a central committee (this is our r), Before a contract was let, the central committee accepted
bids from the cartel mechanism members for the right to the contract. The lowest bidder then
bid the prearranged price in the legitimate auction, and the others submitted higher bids. The
surplus was periodically distributed to the cartel members in proposition to their production
capacities (stigler, 1966)
Proposition 2 An efficient cartel mechanism has the property that the winner transfers to each
of the losers an amount equal to
zi =
E[v(2) − r|v(1) ≥ r]
n
where v(j) represents the jth order statistic and the expectation is taken over the distribution
of the highest valuation. The winner’s expected rent is this amount plus the rent he would have
earned if the auction had been noncooperative.
If the bidding is noncooperative, the total expected profit earned by the winning bidder
would be the expected difference between the highest valuation and the second-highest valuation,
because the bidder would drive the price up to the second-highest valuation. With collusion,
the total expected profit earned by the cartel is the difference between the expected highest
valuation and the minimum price, because the price paid to the seller is the minimum price.
Thus, the extra expected profit resulting from the cartel’s activity, to be shared among the
cartel members, is the difference between these two profit levels, or the expected second-highest
valuation minus the minimum price. The equation above is essential that a first-price sealed-bid
auction be used by the cartel, and has each of the cartel members getting an equal share of this
sum (including the winner, whose total payment including his transfers to fellow cartel members
is this amount less than what it would have been under noncooperative bidding). Because there
is no cost entering the legit auction, if there is any bidder vetoing for the cartel after the prior
auction, bidders can enter the legit auction for free and bid as much as possible to make the
vetoer win the auction without any profit. This behavior makes the winner be indifference
between staying in and vetoing for the mechanism.
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4.2 Auction with Participation Costs
Following the MM model with homogeneous bidders, we discuss the case that bidders’ valuations
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) are drawn from the same distribution function; i.e., F1(·) = F2(·) = · · · = Fn(·).
In order to simplify the calculation and notation, we assume the reserve price r equal to 0. For
bidders using the same cutoff point v∗, the supports of their updated valuation distributions have
the same lower bound when they participate in the prior auction. Thus when vi = v∗, bidder
i can only win the item when all others do not participate in the prior auction. In equilibrium
we have
c = v∗F (v∗)n−1.
Since ρ(v) = vF (v)n−1 − c is an increasing function of v with ρ(0) < 0 and ρ(1) > 0, a unique
symmetric equilibrium exists. When bidders use the same threshold and participate in the
auction, the optimal bidding function is unique, which is symmetric and monotonic increasing,
and is given by
λ(vi, v∗) = vi −
∫ vi
v∗ (F (y)− F (v∗))n−1dy
(F (vi)− F (v∗))n−1
In order to show the winning bidder has incentive to choose not to stay in the cartel, we
have to define a credible veto set and prove if the bidder’s value belongs in the veto set, he will
veto for the cartel.
Definition 1 A ⊆ [0, 1] is a credible veto set, which means vi ∈ A if the individual rational
(IR) condition, pisi > pi
v
i , could not be satisfied, such that
(1) A 6= ∅
(2) pivi (v) > pi
s
i (v)⇒ v ∈ A
(3) pivi (v) < pi
s
i (v)⇒ v /∈ A
Definition 2 Let b∗ be an equilibrium of the first-price auction with participation cost c where
others believe that i′s type is in A.
For example, if A = [vN , 1], then b∗ is an equilibrium of the auction where ratifiers’ values are
distributed on [0, 1] according to F (·), and the vetoer’s value is believed to be distributed on
[vN , 1] according to FN (v) ≡ F (v)−F (vN )1−F (vN ) , which is derived from F (·) using Bayes’ rule.
Definition 3 The cartel mechanism is ratifiable against the seller’s auction if for all i either
(1) there does not exist a credible veto set for i or
(2) there exists a credible veto set A and a corresponding equilibrium b∗ in the post-veto
auction such that piv(v, b∗) = pis(v) for all v ∈ A
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To present above intuition formally, we will construct a credible veto set. We will then show
that there is no credible veto set where all types belonging to it would be indifferent between
vetoing and ratifying. Suppose when one of the bidders vetoes the cartel, others believe that his
value exceeds a cutoff point vN < 1. We will show that there is an equilibrium of the auction
with these revised beliefs such that the vetoer’s payoff in this equilibrium is larger than his cartel
payoff if his value is larger than vN . In other words, it is precisely the types in [vN , 1] who wants
to veto the cartel if a veto causes other bidders to believe that the vetoer’s type is in [vN , 1], so
that A = [vN , 1] is a credible veto set for any bidder i.
Consider the first-price auction where the ratifiers’ values are distributed on [0, 1] according
to F (·) and the vetoer i′s value is distributed on [vN , 1] according to FN (v), defined earlier. The
equilibrium we consider in this auction , denoted by b∗, is given by
b∗i (v) = λ(v) for all v ∈ [vN , 1]
b∗j (v) =
 N0 v ≤ vYλ(v, vY ) v > vY for all j 6= i.
In this equilibrium, the ratifiers use a common cutoff vY , which is determined by the indif-
ference to participation condition. For any ratifier, the maximum of others’ values is distributed
on [vN , 1] according to Gˆ(y) ≡ F (y)n−2FN (y). Let v˜Y be the solution to∫ v˜Y
vN
(v˜Y )dGˆ(y) = c.
where the left hand side denotes the payoff of a v˜Y type ratifier whenever v˜Y ≤ 1. We have
vY = min{1, v˜Y } and vN < vY ≤ 1. Notice that vY is a strictly increasing function of vN until
it reaches 1 for some value of vN and stays there for higher values of vN . The payoff of any
type-v vetoer i is
piv(v, b∗) = max{
∫ max(v,vY )
0
(v − λ(y))dG(y)− c, 0}
Comparing this payoff with the one from the cartel leads to the following lemma. All Proofs are
in appendix.
Lemma 1 There exists a (unique) vN ∈ (c, 1) such that
piv(v; b∗) ≥ pis(v) iff v ≥ vN
Lemma 1 shows that if, after a veto of the cartel mechanism by bidder i, others believe that
his value exceeds vN (and the equilibrium b∗ is played), then i would benefit from such a veto
iff his value exceeds vN . Thus, A = [vN , 1] is a credible veto set for player i. Furthermore, there
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does not exist any credible veto set for which all types in this set are indifferent between vetoing
and ratifying. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There does not exist a credible veto set A (for any i) and a corresponding equilibrium
b∗ in the post-veto auction such that piv(v; b∗) = pis(v) for all v ∈ A.
Thus, proposition 3 then follows from definition 3 and lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 In first-price seal-bid auction format, while participation cost is not equal to
zero,
• The cartel mechanism is not ratifiable.
• There is a discontinuity between c = 0 and c > 0.
Finally, we should notice when c = 0, the model reduces to the benchmark case of MM
model, so the strong cartel could be supported. While c is larger than 0, whether how small
it would be, the cartel mechanism could not be ratifiable. This means there is a discontinuity
between c = 0 and c > 0.
4.3 Standard Auction
In this subsection, we simply discuss our result in last subsection with standard auction de-
signed mechanism. In first subsection in this chapter, we already show the standard optimal
direct mechanism defined in MM paper. Due to the information leakage problem, this optimal
cartel mechanism might not be supported, either. We define some easy notations to give the
intuition, but we do not give a formal proof in our paper. T (w) = F (w)−n
∫ v
r+c(u− r − c)(n−
1)F (u)n−1f(u)du + r + c is the total payment for the winning bidder staying in the cartel.
piv = [v − r − c]F (w)n−1 is the expected profit he vetoing for the cartel, and pis is the expected
profit for the bidder staying in the cartel, which is defined by
pis = [v − T (w)]F (w)n−1
+ [1− F (w)n−1]
∫ v
w
[
T (u)− r − c
n− 1 ]
(n− 1)F (u)n−2f(u)
1− F (w)n−1 du
= [v − T (w)]F (w)n−1
+
∫ v
w
[T (u)− r − c]F (u)n−2f(u)du
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Now we can calculate piv − pis:
piv − pis = [v − r − c− v + T (w)]F (w)n−1 −
∫ v
w
[T (u)− r − c]F (u)n−2f(u)du
≥ 0
From the calculation above, we know the profit for a vetoer is at least equal to or higher
than he staying in the cartel with standard auction format. While the participation cost is
not zero, the strong cartel mechanism is not ratifiable whether the auction format is first-price,
second-price or standard auction design.
Proposition 4 In standard auction format, while participation cost is not equal to zero,
• The cartel mechanism is not ratifiable.
5 Conclusion
The fundamental structure of the auction with participation costs is one through which an
indivisible object is allocated to one of many potential buyers, and in order to participate in the
auction, buyers must incur some costs. In some cases, like government procurement auction,
the bidding costs often run into millions of dollars. This cost would affect bidders’ bidding
strategies. After the cost is incurred, a bidder can submit a bid. As McAfee and McMillan point
out that an cartel agreement is worthless without some way of enforcing it. Since contracts to
fix prices cannot usually be written and illegal, any collusive agreement must be designed to be
self enforcing. If individual rational condition and incentive constrain could not be supported,
the efficient colluding mechanism is generally not freely implemented. When bidders’ actions are
strategic interaction, and their outcome is affected by bidders’ beliefs about others’ values, the
standard mechanism design approach may have information leakage problem from participation
decisions. This observation is important if bidders are making interim participation decisions for
the collusive mechanism. Besides, in real would, pre-bid costs are also required to get bidders
involved in auctions.
In MM paper, they interpret their efficiency model in first-price sealed-bid auction can be
supported. In our model Once a bidder participates in the auction, the bidding strategy depends
on the valuation distributions. For the investigation above, we find the strong cartel mechanism
is no longer sustainable in the presence of participation cost, in which case the bidder with higher
value would bid his true value and veto for the collusive mechanism. This behavior could let
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him earn the maximum benefit, and all the others get zero profit in this auction, which means
the individual rational condition cannot be hold. As such, the strong cartel mechanism might
not be supported in MM model with participation costs in first-price sealed-bid auction.
How does the cartel mechanism investigated in the literatures be supported in other auction
mechanism? This is still a open question here. Except this, when the incentive-compatible
condition could not be hold, the model investigate here might become very complicated to find
out an equilibrium that is dominant strategy for each bidder. Bidders might cheat and bid
higher value to win the prior auction. Then, bidders would update their belief to prepare the
legit auction. This is also an interesting topic for future research. How do people change their
behavior if moral hazard exists in this economy? Besides, we could loose the assumption of
the cartel members could update their information about the winner’s valuation. Then, we can
study how the victims’ strategies destabilize the cartel.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
We have
piv(v) =

0 v ≤ cG(vY )
vG(vY )− c cG(vY ) ≤ v ≤ vY
vG(v)− ∫ vvY λ(y)dG(y)− c v > vY
and
pis(v) =
 z v ≤ cz + ∫ vc G(y)dy v > c
We want to show:
piv(v, b∗) ≥ pis(v)⇒ v ≥ vN
We will first find a vN for which piv(vN , b∗) = pis(vN ), and then check the inqualities.
Step 1 :To show
piv(vN , b∗) = pis(vN )
∵ c < vN ≤ vY
We can write:
pi(vN , b∗) = vNG(vY )− c
and
pis(vN ) = z +
∫ vN
c
G(y)dy
i.e.
vG(vY )− c− z −
∫ v
c
G(y)dy = 0
let
φ(v) = vG(VY (v))−
∫ v
c
G(y)dy − c− z
and
φ′(v) = G(vY (v)) + vG′(vY (v))v′Y (v)−G(v)
= [G(VY (v))−G(v)] + vG′(vY (v))v′Y
∵ G(·) is a cdf increasing function, we get vY (v) ≥ v
15
∴ G(vY (v))−G(v) > 0
⇒ v′Y > 0
∴ φ′(v) > 0
φ(c) = cG(vY (c))− c− z = c[G(vY (c))− 1]− z < 0
φ(1) = G(vY (1))−
∫ 1
c
G(y)dy − c− z
= 1− c−
∫ 1
c
G(y)dy − z
To prove
∫ 1
c [1−G(y)]dy > z, where z(y) =
∫ 1
c [y − c− 1−F (y)f(y) ]G(y)dF (y). We know z is an
increasing function of y. When y = 1, z reaches its maximum at
z =
∫ 1
c
[1− c]dy = (1− c)2
∵ T (y) =
∫ 1
c [1−G(y)]dy is a decreasing function of y
∴ T (y) reaches its minimum at y = 1.
In equilibrium condition, v∗G(v∗) = c.
T (1) =
∫ 1
c
[1−G(1)]dy where 1G(1) = c
=
∫ 1
c
(1− c)dy
= (1− c)2
∴ T (y) ≥ z(y)
∵ G(·) is strictly increasing, it cannot reach equality. ∴ φ(1) > 0
for v < 1, since vY (v) ≥ v. Since φ(v) is continuous, φ(c) < 0, and φ(1) > 0, a unique
solution to φ(v) = 0 exists, and is our candidate for vN .
Step 2: We want to show
piv(v, b∗) > pis(v), for v > vN
Fix c, and hence vN and vY are fixed, we have c ≤ cG(vY ) ≤ vN ≤ vY . The payoff difference
piv(v; b∗)− pis(v) is continuous and given by:
piv(v, b∗)− pis(v) =

−z v < c I
−z − ∫ vc G(y)dy c ≤ v < cG(vY ) II
vG(vY )− c− z −
∫ v
c G(y)dy
c
G(vY )
≤ v ≤ vY III
vG(v)− ∫ vvY λ(y)dG(y)− c− z − ∫ vc G(y)dy v > vY IV
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I,II:
piv(v, b∗)− pis(v) < 0, when v < c
G(vY )
III:
let ϕ(v) = vG(vY )− c−
∫ v
c G(y)dy − pi
∵ ϕ(vN ) = φ(vN ) = 0
ϕ′(v) = G(vY )−G(v) > 0, when v < vY
ϕ′(vY ) = 0
∴ ϕ(v)

< 0 v < vN
= 0 v = vN
> 0 v > vN
IV:
d
dv
= [piv(v, b∗)− pis(v)]
=
d
dv
[vG(v)−
∫ v
vY
λ(y)dG(y)− c−
∫ v
c
G(y)dy − pi]
= G(v) + vG′(v)− λ(v)G′(v)−G(v)
= [v − λ(v)]G′(v) > 0,
∵ [v − λ(v)] > 0
∴ increasing when v > vY
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
This proof is by contradiction. suppose there exists a credible veto set A and a corresponding
equilibrium in the post-veto auction b∗ such that
piv(v, b∗) = pis(v) for all v ∈ A (1)
Note that it must be the case that piv(v; b∗) > 0 for all v ∈ A, because pis(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [0, 1].
Let a∗ = infA. Since any vetoer type’s payoff would be zero if she were not participating in the
auction, the vetoer’s cutoff in b∗ must be a∗ ≥ c, i.e., all vetoer types participate the auction
with probability one. Moreover, the continuity of payoff functions imply that v = a∗ satisfies
(1) as well. Let a1 < a2 < · · · < aJ be the cutoffs of the ratifiers where aj ∈ [0, 1] is used by nj
bidders and
∑J
j=1 nj = n− 1.
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Suppose that a∗ < 1. It must be that a1 < a∗, since otherwise the ratifiers using a1 are sure
to lose in the auction, and thus have a negative payoff. For vetoer types v ∈ (a∗, a1) we have
piv(v; b∗)− pis(v) = v
J∏
j=1
F (aj)nj − c−
∫ v
c
G(y)dy − z,
which is strictly increasing in v, since
∏J
j=1 F (aj)
nj ≥ F (a1)n−1 > G(v). So, types in (a∗, a1)
have strict incentive to veto, and therefore must also belong to the veto set A, which contradicts
(1). Now suppose that a∗ = 1, i.e., A = 1. Given that the vetoer is participating with probability
one, none of the ratifiers will participate, and thus
piv(1; b∗) = 1− c > pis,
a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Standard Auction:
Calculate piv − pis:
piv − pis = [v − r − c− v + T (w)]F (w)n−1
−
∫ v
w
[T (u)− r − c]F (u)n−2f(u)du
= [T (w)− r − c]F (w)n−1
−
∫ v
w
[T (u)− r − c]F (u)n−2f(u)du
= F (w)−n
∫ v
r+c
(u− r − c)(n− 1)F (u)n−1f(u)duF (w)n−1
−
∫ v
w
[F (u)−n
∫ v
r+c
(u− r − c)(n− 1)F (u)n−1f(u)du]F (u)n−2f(u)du
= F (w)−1
∫ v
r+c
(u− r − c)(n− 1)F (u)n−1f(u)du
−
∫ v
r+c
(u− r − c)(n− 1)F (u)n−1f(u)du
∫ v
w
F (u)−2f(u)du
∵
∫ v
w F (u)
−2f(u)du =
∫ v
w F (u)
−2dF (u), Let F (u) = x, we can get:
∫ v
w
F (u)−2dF (u) =
∫ F (v)
F (w)
x−2dx
= −x−1|F (v)F (w)
= − 1
F (v)
+
1
F (w)
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Let
∫ v
r+c(u− r − c)(n− 1)F (u)n−1f(u)du = G(u), we can get:
F (w)−1G(u)−G(u)(− 1
F (v)
+
1
F (w)
) =
1
F (v)
G(u)
≥ 0
Q.E.D.
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